
The White House has confirmed the authenticity of a Signal group chat involving senior members of the Trump administration, in which plans for potential military strikes against Yemen were allegedly discussed. Participants in the encrypted conversation included Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz—and, controversially, a journalist. This revelation has sparked a wave of outrage among Washington’s national security experts.
Jeffrey Goldberg, editor of The Atlantic, revealed that he had been inadvertently added to the closed Signal group, where top officials exchanged operational details about planned attacks on Houthi insurgents in Yemen—discussing targets, specific weapons systems, and even the sequence of strikes. The White House stated that Goldberg’s number had been “mistakenly added” to the chat, and an internal review is underway. Pete Hegseth, meanwhile, claimed that “no military plans were discussed” on the platform and insisted that no rules had been violated.
The response was swift and scathing. Democratic Congressman Bennie Thompson called for a formal investigation, denouncing the incident as a display of “staggering incompetence.” He emphasized that the discussion of classified material outside secure environments—particularly in the presence of unauthorized individuals—was “beyond debate; it is unacceptable.” Republican Michael Lawler echoed the concern, stating, “Classified information must never be transmitted through unsecured channels, especially to those without clearance.”
According to existing protocols, discussions of military operations and planning fall under top-level classified status. Such conversations are permitted only within SCIFs (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities)—secure rooms stripped of phones and electronic devices. When in-person attendance is not possible, officials are mandated to use government-approved encrypted communication tools. Signal is not among them.
Larry Pfeiffer, former Director of the White House Situation Room, noted that senior officials are always equipped with secure communication devices—hardened phones, laptops, and video links—even while traveling. Despite its end-to-end encryption, Signal does not meet the required standards for classified communication; devices may be compromised, and deleted messages could potentially be recovered or intercepted.
The Department of Defense formally stated in 2023 that Signal, iMessage, and WhatsApp are not authorized for handling non-public information. Unlike Signal, government-managed apps undergo centralized administration and monitoring, reducing the risk of breaches.
A former Defense Department staffer, speaking anonymously, confirmed that she and her colleagues occasionally used Signal—but only for innocuous reminders like “check your work laptop” or “follow up on that issue.” Sensitive matters were never broached directly, and even vague references were quickly shifted to secure channels. She described the current incident as “utterly unacceptable,” adding that in her two decades of government service, she had “never seen anything like it.”
What alarms observers most is that sensitive military plans were reportedly exposed to an unauthorized civilian—a journalist. Under U.S. protocols, access to classified information is strictly limited to individuals with the appropriate security clearance, who have signed nondisclosure agreements and whose access is based on a strict “need-to-know” basis. The Trump administration has previously taken a hardline stance against leaks—particularly to the press. Now, it finds itself at the heart of a scandal.
Several members of Congress, including Rep. Seth Magaziner, have already demanded a thorough investigation. Magaziner stated that officials named in The Atlantic report must be called to testify. The central question: how frequently—and with what impunity—have high-ranking officials relied on unsecured messaging platforms to share information of critical national importance?