Do Son 
Organized criminal syndicates originating from East and Southeast Asia have begun expanding their influence far beyond the region amid mounting pressure from local authorities. According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), these groups are adopting a “hedging” strategy—diversifying the geography of their operations and targeting the most vulnerable and least protected regions, including those outside of Asia.
At the heart of this shift lies the transformation of criminal enterprise: what once were localized networks are now evolving into a sprawling global criminal ecosystem. The report describes industrial-scale hubs generating approximately $40 billion annually. These hubs were formerly concentrated in the special economic zones of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines. However, in response to intensified government crackdowns, many have relocated to new territories while retaining their full infrastructure and protective mechanisms.
Analysts note that organized crime in the region operates on a migratory model: when one hub is shut down, another swiftly emerges—often within purpose-built business parks offering favorable legal and tax regimes. These operations are frequently relocated overnight. The centers function under a “crime-as-a-service” model and involve tens of thousands of trafficked individuals and coerced workers, enabling seamless and continuous expansion.
A key driver of the syndicates’ success is their adept use of cryptocurrency and shadow banking networks for money laundering. This not only allows them to evade financial restrictions but also enables deep infiltration of global financial systems. East Asian criminal entities have emerged as global leaders in online fraud and underground banking, with their impact extending far beyond their original geographic boundaries.
UNODC has identified links between these Asian networks and criminal operations in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands, as well as evidence of their activity in Europe and both Americas. Of particular concern are developments in Myanmar, where thousands of individuals were liberated from scam centers, only to be left stranded without support.
The report pays special attention to the Pacific Islands—Vanuatu, for example—where fraudsters exploited the “citizenship by investment” scheme to evade extradition. Infrastructures such as casinos and resort complexes have been constructed to serve as façades for illicit enterprises.
One of the most significant enablers of this criminal expansion has been the migration to Telegram channels and platforms operating on the open internet. Among the most notorious is Huione Guarantee, which offers counterfeit documents, money laundering services, phishing kits enhanced with AI capabilities, and its own cryptocurrency products—including a USD-pegged stablecoin. Despite having lost its banking license in Cambodia, the platform continues to operate and remains a focal point in the global fraud ecosystem.
Furthermore, criminal organizations from other regions are increasingly aligning with Asian syndicates. Together, they are forming new alliances powered by advanced technologies: from malware and deepfakes to AI-driven tools designed to bypass verification systems and automate attacks. This evolution has rendered cyber-enabled fraud more sophisticated, expansive, and resistant to eradication.
The report also outlines a series of countermeasures: from tightening financial controls on illicit flows to enhancing international cooperation on asset recovery. It underscores the urgent need for national strategies specifically tailored to combat crime in the digital domain.
In February, Thai authorities cut power to border regions in Myanmar, where entire office buildings had sprung up in recent years—staffed primarily by victims of human trafficking, coerced into orchestrating fraudulent operations.
